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Abstract The book ‘Voting and Collective Decision Making’ by A. Laruelle and
F. Valenciano provides a critical revision of the theoretical foundations of collec-
tive yes-or-no decisions. It is a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power,
revolving around a fundamental question: given a committee, what voting rule should
be used?
1 Brief summary of the book and motivation of research
In a nutshell, the theory and measurement of voting power revolves around the ques-
tion to what extent a voter is able to control the outcome of a vote. This question is
fundamental as it provides the foundation to the question of what voting procedure
should be used for a decision-making body when we deal with criteria such as, e.g.
egalitarianism. As an example take the European Union where the decision-making
processes of the EU institutions should be ideally designed—from an egalitarian point
of view—such that every EU citizen has equal voting power. Especially, the several
enlargements of the EU have led to a renewal of interest in this topic and heated debates
in the scientific community along with controversial academic papers.
The main purpose of Voting and Collective Decision Making by A. Laruelle and
F. Valenciano (L&V) is to provide a critical revision of the theoretical foundations
of collective yes-or-no decisions as well as a revision of the recommendations when
it comes to the design of decision-making procedures. The focus of their approach
is to include not only the voting rule1 as unique ingredient but to draw a clear
1 L&V define a voting rule as a monotonic and proper simple game. In other words, it is a set of winning
coalitions which contains the grand coalition and all supersets of winning coalitions. It does not contain the
empty set or the complement of a winning coalition (see their Definition 1, p. 5).
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distinction regarding the environment of the collective decision making bodies. They
introduce two different types of committees: the first has solely the capacity to accept
or reject proposals submitted to it and is referred to as ‘take-it-or-leave-it committees’.
In contradistinction, a ‘bargaining committee’ has the capacity to bargain over feasible
agreements.
This book is a fundamental contribution to the theory and measurement of voting
and voting power. L&V’s request to specify the type of the committee (environment)
in order to clarify the notion ‘power’ or ‘voting power’ is certainly justified. Espe-
cially illuminating are their findings in chapter 4 on bargaining committees where
they extend classical findings of Nash (1950) by game theoretic concepts of bargain-
ing power. The different chapters of this book could be used as teaching material for
graduate courses on voting, bargaining or voting power.
Before I comment in detail on the different chapters let me first elaborate in Sect. 2
of this article why a book of this kind represents a fundamental contribution to the
literature on voting and voting power. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this report evaluate their
chaps. 3, 4 and 5 in detail.
2 Brief detour to history and related literature
The 64-years history of the theory and measurement of voting power has been haunted
by a lot of confusion, conceptually as well as with respect to attribution of authorship.
In their historical account from 2005, Felsenthal and Machover (F&M) identify two
main phenomena of this unfortunate evolution. First, similar ideas were reinvented sev-
eral times as many researchers were unaware of previous work. Second, the meaning
and implications of basic concepts was widely misunderstood or simply disregarded
by scientists for several decades.
The latter aspect is presumably the main reason why the theory and measurement of
voting power has failed to achieve wide acceptance beyond scientific specialism—it
suffers from a problem of arbitrariness.2 Why applying the Penrose–Banzhaf mea-
sure3? Why not the Shapley–Shubik index4 or any other power measure? This ques-
tion should be addressed first when it comes to studying real-world or designed voting
systems. Instead, measures were often applied mechanically with little or no attempt
to justify a particular choice. Unfortunately, different measures can lead to different
results for the same data which damages the standing of this academic discipline due
to the aura of ambiguity.
Another unfortunate common practice, when comparing the positions of a given
voter a under two alternative decision rules, is to incautiously normalize power mea-
sures and work, e.g. with the Penrose–Banzhaf index, the normalized version of the
Penrose–Banzhaf measure. This is an error because the index measures a voter’s
2 For further reasons confining acceptance see the appendix.
3 Penrose (1946) was the first to propose a measure of voting power which later came to be known as
‘the (absolute) Banzhaf measure (index). Penrose’s pioneering work was widely ignored and his measure
independently reinvented by Banzhaf (1965).
4 Following the terminology of Felsenthal and Machover (1998), I reserve the term index of voting power
for relative measures. The latter—as in the case of the Shapley–Shubik index—always add up to 1.
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relative share in the total power of all voters, which is not fixed. A change of decision
rule may therefore lead to a smaller relative share in total sum of the applied power
measures with the voter having an increase in absolute power. This misunderstanding
was obvious in the heated debates preceding the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. For exam-
ple, the Penrose–Banzhaf measure of a representative of Poland in the EU Council
of Ministers under the Treaty of Nice is 0.03116 as opposed to the higher value of
0.09816 in the Lisbon Treaty. The Penrose–Banzhaf index, however, draws a com-
pletely different picture as it drops from 7.4192 to 5.7113% (for the numbers see Aziz
and Leech forthcoming). The normalization of power measures involves great loss
of information and its use for different decision rules is inappropriate as it compares
cakes of different sizes. In addition, normalization makes the voting scenario sound
like a zero-sum game when in fact all voters could profit from a change of the voting
rule, e.g. from unanimity to simple majority. Here, normalization would lead to the
erroneous conclusion that both are the same since both are symmetric.
The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Para-
doxes by Felsenthal and Machover (F&M) from 1998 was the first monograph wholly
devoted to the theory of a priori voting power. It provided a systematic critical revision
of the foundations of traditional voting power theory. The authors introduced a distinc-
tion between two different kinds of voting power: ‘power as influence’ (I-power) and
‘power as a prize’ (P-power). The former is operationalized as the probability to influ-
ence the decision of a voting body, related to ‘policy seeking’ as the motive of voting.
Here, the outcome of a vote is a public good (or public bad) that may benefit (or harm)
all the voters. F&M consider the (absolute) Penrose–Banzhaf measure as the right
measure of a priori voting power on the basis of some I-power postulates (see Sect. 7
in Felsenthal and Machover 1998). The second type of power, P-power, is a notion
related to ‘office seeking’. The vote (decision-making process) determines the win-
ning coalition who in turn distributes a fixed purse among them. P-power measures
the expected share of a voting body’s member. F&M consider the Shapley–Shubik
index, derived from cooperative game theory, as the most serious known candidate
for a measure of this kind (see Comment 7.10.1 in Felsenthal and Machover 1998).5
This index was introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954) who proposed an index of
a priori voting power as a direct application of the Shapley value (as introduced in
Shapley 1953) to simple (TU) games.6
The I/P-power distinction of F&M provided a first guidance to the question when
to apply which power measure to (real-world) decision making bodies.
With the success of this book, however, also came criticism from which I will briefly
name two main points:
(1) F&M consider the Penrose–Banzhaf measure as the only reasonable way to mea-
sure I-power by, whereas they consider the Shapley–Shubik index as the most
serious candidate for a measure of P-power. This clear cut distinction represents
5 They point out, however, that this index violates the added blocker postulate (see their Definition 7.9.8)
which, in their opinion, a reasonable index of a priori voting power should satisfy.
6 The success of this article as well as the neglect of Penrose’s earlier work has led to the unfortunate view
that the theory and measurement of voting power is a branch of cooperative game theory only. For details
see Felsenthal and Machover (2005, Sect. 3).
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I-power and P-power as disjunctive concepts which led to critique. For exam-
ple, Napel and Widgren (2004) develop a framework for measuring influence in
contexts that involve strategic interaction and require strategic equilibrium anal-
ysis of agenda setting, bargaining, etc. Applying this framework to spatial voting
in the UN Security Council, Napel and Widgren (2008) assume a one-dimen-
sional convex policy space and demonstrate that the Shapley–Shubik index can
serve as a suitable measure for influence (identified with the probability of being
critical for the equilibrium policy outcome).
(2) L&V consider the I/P power distinction as too vague and argue that the ques-
tion what ‘power’ or ‘voting power’ is cannot be sufficiently addressed without
specifying the type of the committee. Not only should the voting rule be taken
into account but also the environment in which the rule is applied. The authors
blame the vagueness in the specification of the voting situation underlying most
of the literature on voting power.
As a first approach to include environments of voting, L&V distinguish between
two types of committees: ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ (tioli) committees and ‘bargaining’ com-
mittees. The proposals that a tioli committee has to vote upon are (i) independent, i.e.
there is no room for linking decisions on different proposals which rules out strategic
agreements between the voters, (ii) submitted by some external agency and (iii) are not
modifiable, i.e. the committee can only accept or reject them. By contrast a bargaining
committee (i) deals with different issues over time as in the tioli case but (ii) bargains
about each issue in search of an agreement, in which task it is entitled to adjust the
proposal. Moreover, (iii) any winning coalition can enforce an agreement and (iv) for
each issue a different configuration of preferences emerges in the committee over the
set of feasible agreements. They argue that this distinction provides benchmarks for a
better understanding of less clear real-world situations.
L&V’s Chap. 1 introduces some notations and terminologies, whereas Chapt. 2
briefly reviews seminal papers and introduces (informally) the distinction between
tioli and bargaining committees. I will comment on the remaining Chaps. 3 to 5. For
this purpose I give a brief overview of L&V’s findings first.
3 Take-it-or-leave-it committees vis-à-vis traditional voting theory
3.1 One stage games
L&V’s Chap. 3 is concerned with tioli committees. As the proposal cannot be modified
and there is no room for linking decisions on different proposals (independence) there
is no room for strategic considerations. The best that any voter can do is to vote ‘yes’ or
‘no’ according to his or her preferences.7 The authors give as examples a referendum,
and an academic committee that decides by vote on whether to admit a student to a
programme without capacity constraints. The key insight and LV’s main point is that
in tioli situations the relevant notions should be success, i.e. the likelihood of being
7 This model allows no indifference between acceptance and rejection.
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on the winning side—irrespective of whether one’s vote is decisive for it or not.8 This
is different to the traditional voting power theory which uses the likelihood of being
decisive (the Penrose–Banzhaf measure) as the relevant quantity. Both approaches,
however, are based on the same probabilistic model that each vote configuration is
equally likely. This a priori assumption follows traditional voting theory and is justi-
fied on normative grounds. It disregards particular personalities or preferences of the
voters such that the actual pattern of voting behavior is not taken into account.9 In a
priori models, the probability of success of a dummy voter10 is equal to 1/2, whereas
the one of a dictator equals 1.
L&V consider the question of the optimal voting rule in a tioli committee from two
points of view: egalitarianism and utilitarianism. The former says that an equal treat-
ment should be given to equals, or, if utility functions are given, the same (expected)
utility level. The latter principle intends to maximize the sum of voter’s utilities. The
utility they introduce for this purpose assumes a utility level of zero in case of ‘no
success’ (not being on the winning side) and distinguish between ‘positive’ success
and ‘negative’ success.11 Assuming the same (expected) utility preferences for any
voter, L&V show that egalitarianism is implemented by any rule that assigns equal a
priori success to each voter. Of course, any symmetric rule satisfies this principle. The
utilitarian principle on top determines the optimal quota of the symmetric rule, which
varies with the importance given to positive success. The higher the latter the smaller
is the quota (with a lower bound of 1/2 in order to avoid non-proper rules).
3.2 Committees of representatives
Section 3.8 uses the material developed in the previous subsection to provide theory-
based recommendations on the choice of the voting rule for a committee of represen-
tatives—which is a special type of a committee. Here, each member acts on behalf of
a group of individuals. As an example take the Council of Ministers of the European
Union (EU) where EU citizen’s participation in decision making is largely indirect
since political decisions are made by representative agents elected by citizens. This is
a two-stage process in which citizens exercise direct power at the first stage, in elect-
ing their representative, whereas in the second stage the power over actual political
decisions is exercised only indirectly by means of the representative. Ideally, every
European citizen should be treated equally (L&V’s sense they should have equal a
8 The measure ‘success’ goes back to Penrose (1946) who refers to it as the probability of a voter ‘being
on the winning side’. Instead of success, however, he proposes to work with a measure which is defined
by the amount by which his chance of being on the winning side exceeds one half which—multiplied by
1/2—later came to be known as the (absolute) Banzhaf measure (index).
9 This abstraction is necessary to focus on the effect of the voting rule, disentangled from behavioral effects
(for details see e.g. Roth 1988, p. 9).
10 This is a voter who is never decisive, i.e. who’s vote never makes any difference to the outcome of a
vote.
11 The former measures the utility of a voter being successful when s/he votes ‘yes’, the latter when voting
‘no’ (L&V’s equation 25, p.73). The idea is that when rejection of the proposal to be voted upon means
maintaining the status quo there may be a bias in either direction. A conservative party, for example, might
consider keeping the status quo more important than changes.
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priori expected utility or probability of success), whereas the total sum of expected
utilities of all citizens should be maximized. The question of this section is a profound
question from a normative point of view: given the number of members of a committee
of representatives and the sizes of each group represented, what is the optimal voting
rule with respect to the two principles of egalitarianism and utilitarianism?
A common simplifying assumption in two-stage models of citizen’s participation
in modern democratic states is that every representative always follows the majority
opinion of his/her group on every issue. In other words, the group decides by sim-
ple majority whether the representative should vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This assumption
is also used by L&V with which the question of the optimal voting rule boils down
to finding an ‘optimal’ rule for the second stage which decides how the votes of the
representatives should be aggregated in order to make a (political) decision.
Traditional voting power theory uses the Penrose–Banzhaf measure (the likelihood
to be decisive) as the default voting power approach for this case.12 This assumption
leads to the classic first square root rule for two-tier voting systems, which states that
if each represented group is sufficiently large, each citizen’s Penrose–Banzhaf mea-
sures are equal (with negligible error) if and only if the one of the representatives
are proportional to the square root of the size of the corresponding represented group.
This represents an egalitarian solution based on the Penrose–Banzhaf measure without
explicitly defining utilities.13
L&V come to a different conclusion than traditional voting power theory. Since
they base their analysis on the probability of success rather than the probability of
being decisive, their finding is that in a two-tier voting system the egalitarian principle
is basically satisfied for any decision rule used by the committee of representatives.
By ‘basically satisfied’ they mean that the a priori probability of success of any indi-
vidual is approximately 1/2 regardless of the rule since the a priori likelihood of being
critical is negligible if the represented group is sufficiently large. Here, success is
approximated by the probability of being on the winning side by mere luck—which
equals 1/2 in an (a priori) dichotomous voting situation. As a conclusion, any rep-
resented individual in a tioli two-tier voting system should in practice be indifferent
with respect to the rule in the committee. This is of course a very different conclusion
from the one reached by traditional voting power approach, which is based on compar-
isons in relative terms between very small numbers (the likelihood of being decisive
for individuals) which in L&V’s view ‘artificially dramatizes differences between
individuals’ (L&V, p.85).
The second square root rule of traditional voting power theory is concerned with
minimizing the mean ‘majority deficit’ of a two-tier voting system. This deficit is
defined as the deviation of the indirect two-tier decision-making rule from a ‘direct
democracy’ simple majority rule. As an example take the US elections from 2000
12 For example, in F&M terminology legislation is commonly interpreted as a public good which suggests
to base the analysis on I-power. Here, any payoff of being on the winning side does not imply ‘taking away’
any utility of any other voter. To the contrary, the more people are on the winning side the stronger the
collective ‘yes’ statement.
13 It can be shown, however, that the Banzhaf measure equals expected a priori utility assuming a special
type of utility function (L&V, pp. 85–86).
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Table 1 Results for a committee of representatives: traditional voting power theory versus the take-it-or-
leave-it model
Traditional voting theorya Take-it-or-leave-it model
Egalitarianism First square root rule: assign a voting rule such that the
representative’s probability of decisiveness, r , is
proportional to the square root of the size of the





Second square root rule (majoritarianism): use a
weighted majority rule such that each representative is
assigned to a voting weight wr proportional to the
square root of the size of the represented group,




a Based on the Penrose–Banzhaf measure
where G.W. Bush won the presidential election although a majority of the US voters
was in favor of A. Gore. Here, the majority deficit is measured as the size of the major-
ity in favor of Gore minus the number of voters having voted for Bush. In general, in
the a priori model of every voting outcome being equally likely, the mean majority
deficit of a voting rule is given by the expected majority deficit.
The second square root rule states that in a two-tier voting system the mean majority
deficit is minimized (with negligible error) if the committee of representatives uses
a weighted majority rule such that each representative is assigned to a voting weight
proportional to the square root of the size of the group and a relative quota close
to 50% (see Theorem 3.4.9 in Felsenthal and Machover 1998 and or Theorem 3 in
Felsenthal and Machover 1999). Note that the second square root rule recommends
voting weights proportional to the square root of the size of the group, whereas the
first square root rule assigns to each representative a Penrose–Banzhaf measure pro-
portional to the square root of the size of the group. L&V confirm the second square
root rule, however, based on different grounds: a utilitarian principle applied to a two-
tier tioli committee.14 Table 1 summarizes the findings of L&V and traditional voting
theory for committees of representatives.
The second square root rule confirms in fact the first one, when Penrose’s Limit
Theorem (PLT) holds. The latter states that under certain conditions and if the distri-
bution of weights is not too skewed (in other words, the ratio of the largest weight to
the smallest is not very high), then the relative powers of the voters tend to approxi-
mate closely to their respective relative weights. Lindner and Machover 2004; Lindner
2004; Lindner and Owen 2007 provide proofs for some special cases with respect to
the Penrose–Banzhaf measure as well as the Shapley–Shubik index. In other words,
when PLT holds the voters’ voting weights are with close approximation proportional
to their Penrose–Banzhaf measures (Shapley–Shubik indices).
When PLT holds, this finding suggests in combination with the first square root
rule to assign voting weights to the representatives proportional to the square root of
14 For completeness, it should be stressed that this is the result when positive and negative success are
equally important to the individuals. If there is a bias in either direction, L&V’s results suggests that the
voting weights stay the same, however, the quota should be adjusted (their Proposition 25 and 26).
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the represented groups (constituencies)15 —in accordance with the second square root
rule.16
3.3 Take-it-or-leave-it models: critical appraisal and placement in the literature
As stressed by L&V on p. 67, success and decisiveness are related. In particular, it
can be shown in the a priori case of non-spatial dichotomous voting—where every
voting outcome is assumed to be equally likely—the probability of success is given by
one half (luck—success without being decisive) plus the product of the likelihood of
decisiveness times one half (outcome would change if voter changes his or her mind).
The concept of a priori success and decisiveness ‘differ only in using a different scale
of measurement’ (Hosli and Machover 2004). It should be stressed, however, that this
only holds in the a priori case where all vote configurations are equally probable. For
general probability distributions over vote configurations, ‘success and decisiveness
are not only conceptually different but also analytically independent’ (p. 68).
However, a priori models can still provide different results with respect to the con-
cepts success and decisiveness when it comes to two-tier systems. L&V show that this
is the case for the criteria of egalitarianism when the individual likelihood of being
decisive is very small—as in the two-tier EU Council of Ministers case—such that
success is approximately given by 1/2, regardless of the rule. Here, the ratio between
the success probabilities of two voters is always approximately 1 whereas the relative
terms between very small numbers (the likelihood of being decisive for individuals)
might not be. However, note that the findings of L&V does not rule out the first square
root rule as it states that with respect to egalitarianism the rule does not matter. In
addition, if PLT holds both the traditional and the tioli approach come to the same
conclusion (since the second square root rule confirms the first one). In summary, the
result of both approaches do not oppose each other.
Whether or not one agrees with this view, L&V’s specification of the environment
of voting is without any doubt an important step towards the fundamental issue of what
the relevant notions are in the context of voting and how to measure them. However,
a tioli committee is a very special case of an environment. L&V themselves admit
that it is seldom found in real-world committees where there is usually some room for
negotiations (p. 53). Nevertheless, it provides an important reference point for more
realistic models.
Let me close the discussion on Chap. 3 by the following remark: note that the proba-
bility of being lucky—to have success without being decisive—depends on the model
setup. As an example take voting situations with several ordered levels of approval
in the input and in the output, so called ( j, k) simple games with j options (see e.g.
15 This suggestion—the so called Jagelionian compromise—played an important role in the heated debates
about the reforms of the EU Council of Ministers preceding the Lisbon Treaty (see e.g. http://www.
economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9341010). See also Sect. 5 of this article.
16 Note that this result gives an answer to the methodological problem of the first square root rule as to
how to find a voting rule such that the Penrose–Banzhaf measures fulfill the proportion requirement. If
PLT holds, the Penrose–Banzhaf measures are approximately proportional to the voting weights such that
assigning the latter proportional to the square root of the population establishes the egalitarian principle.
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Freixas and Zwicker 2003). Here, the voting situation could be a committee having to
determine a grade for a student. With j options the likelihood to have the (most) pre-
ferred voting outcome by sheer luck is 1/j , which approaches zero when the number
of options increases. It is clearly zero in spatial voting games as e.g. when the vote is
on the preferred tax rate in a continuum between 0 and 1 (see e.g. Napel and Widgren
2009). Here, the a priori probability of success equals the probability of being decisive
as getting one’s preferred outcome by luck is a priori equal to zero.
4 Bargaining committees: at the intersection of voting and cooperative
game theory
Chapter 4 of L&V discusses voting situations in a bargaining environment. This bar-
gaining setup crucially distinguishes itself from the tioli setup in that the proposal can
be adjusted in order to reach a consensus among a winning coalition which has the
capacity to enforce it. The committee negotiates in search of an agreement over a set
of feasible alternatives. The latter is determined by a voting rule that prescribes which
coalitions can enforce an agreement. The second ingredient next to the voting rule is
the voters’ preference profile (the set of feasible utility vectors). L&V’s game theoretic
model thus has two basic ingredients: the voting rule and the preference profile. In
other words, for a given number of voters a bargaining solution in the L&V setup is
a map from the Cartesian product of all feasible preference profiles and the set of all
voting rules to the set of all payoffs vectors in an appropriate Euclidean space.
4.1 One stage games
The question of player’s justified (expected) payoff is first approached from a coop-
erative-axiomatic point of view. Given the voting rule and preferences the question is
as to what can be considered as reasonable expectations for rational players (the value
of players). The two-ingredient model allows L&V to generalize Nash’s bargaining
theory which can be seen as the special case where the voting rule is unanimity. For
this special case, Nash (1950) provided compelling conditions about the expected
outcome: efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and invariance
with respect to positive affine transformations. He showed that these four conditions
determine a unique solution, known as the Nash solution, which is given by the point
in the set of feasible utility vectors17 where the product of utility gains with respect to
the status quo (the disagreement outcome) is maximized.18
The symmetry axiom of the Nash solution implies that symmetry between the play-
ers’ set of feasible utility vectors and status quo results in equal bargaining skills and
hence equal payoffs. Kalai (1977) introduced the family of non-symmetric Nash solu-
tions, which is derived by dropping the symmetry axiom and singles out outcomes
that maximize the product of utility gains, after each gain is raised to the power of a
17 This set is assumed to be compact and convex.
18 In his paper from 1953 he replaces the condition symmetry by anonymity, requiring that the labels of
the players should not influence the solution.
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player specific weight. These weights can be interpreted as an expression of different
bargaining skills (power).19
These weights are precisely the impact of the voting rule on the bargaining agree-
ment in the setup of L&V. This impact is therefore separated from the bargaining
solution following Nash in the sense that voting rules affect the bargaining skills by
means of the weights in the asymmetric Nash product. By adapting the axioms used
by Nash (1950) and two of the axioms used by Shapley (1953) to their two-ingredient
setting, L&V intend to narrow down the set of admissible agreements.20 L&V’s main
result of this chapter (their Theorem 29) shows that these conditions are not enough to
single out an agreement for a bargaining problem, however, they restrict the structure
of the solution. Their result says that the player’s expectations are determined by the
weighted Nash solution where the weights are an anonymous real-valued function of
the voting rule (not the preference profile), assigning a weight of zero (no bargaining
skills) to members occupying null seats. The classical Shapley–Shubik index qualifies
as a possible candidate for these weights.
Given a certain voting rule, a further implication of their result is that the bargaining
solution for TU-committees21 can be taken as weights in the Nash product in order to
determine the solution for any configuration of preferences (any utility space).22
Next to the axiomatic point of view from cooperative game theory, L&V approach
the question about reasonable agreements by considering the bargaining process from
which the axiomatic approach abstracts. In particular, L&V introduce protocols which
set up rules according to which negotiations proceed in the committee. For example,
a protocol should state how a player gets into the position to put a proposal for an
agreement on the table and what happens if this proposal is not accepted. Here, the
decision-making process is modelled as a non-cooperative game. In this approach, the
final vote is merely the formal settlement of a non-cooperative process of bargaining.
The positive approach of setting up protocols describing real-world bargaining pro-
cesses is of course very complex. L&V’s aim is to provide a simple reference model
that shows how the given set of winning coalitions could influence this protocol.
The main result of this section identifies a stationary23 subgame perfect equilibrium
where the corresponding payoff vectors converge to the asymmetric Nash bargaining
19 Binmore (1998) interpreted these as strategic advantages in specific bargaining circumstances. Grout
(1984) uses the asymmetric Nash solution to model bargaining outcomes between unions and shareholders
on input levels, profits and wages depending on union bargaining skills.
20 Next to Nash’s three other conditions on the payoff space, they adapt the condition ‘anonymity’ used by
Nash—referring to the preference configuration—and Shapley—referring to the voting rule—to hold for
both elements. In other words, when players switch their labels in the preference space and the voting game,
this should not affect their expected payoff. Finally, the adaptation of Shapley’s condition ‘null player’ says
that a player occupying a null seat (who’s vote never makes any difference) should be assigned to her status
quo payoff.
21 By definition, transferable utility (TU) games are cooperative games where utility can be transferred
between players. Hence the only relevant information is a real number—the total utility—for each subset
of a coalition. In the special case of simple voting this number is either zero (losing) or one (winning).
22 This is L&V’s equation (55).
23 Here, a strategy of a player consists of (1) a proposal whenever it is his or her turn to be the proposer and
(2) a threshold as to what proposals he or she would accept from others. Stationary means that this action
plan stays the same in every round.
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solution when the probability of failure or breakdown of the process goes to zero (the
game always goes on when a proposal is not accepted). Here, the individual weights
in the Nash product are given by the probabilities with which a player is chosen to be
a proposer (their Theorem 33).
In the following, these exogenous probabilities are specified further by introduc-
ing different probabilistic protocols, i.e. assigning concrete probabilities of selecting a
coalition and a corresponding proposer. The idea is to link the probability to be the pro-
poser—the source of bargaining power—with the voting rule. Among other indices,
the Shapley–Shubik index emerges under a variety of protocols as e.g. Shapley (1953)
classical ‘protocol’ of choosing an order of the players at random and let players join a
coalition in this order until a winning coalition is formed. Here, the last pivotal player
is the proposer such that his or her overall probability of being the proposer is given
by the Shapley–Shubik index.24
4.2 Bargaining in a committee of representatives
The question of the best voting rule in terms of egalitarianism and utilitarianism is
difficult in bargaining committees since these two concepts usually conflict. Egalitar-
ianism would suggest that any player gets equal utility gains in absolute terms with
respect to the status quo, whereas utilitarianism suggests to maximize the sum of all
utility gains. Shapley (1969) showed that the Nash bargaining solution can be seen as
a compromise between these conflicting concepts.25
From L&V’s axiomatic cooperative-game-theoretic result we learned that any rea-
sonable bargaining solution with given configuration of preferences and a voting rule
should drop out as a solution to Nash’s asymmetric bargaining solution where the
weights of the Nash product are determined entirely by the voting rule. Assume that
we accept the above compromise as ‘fair’ then then any symmetric voting rule would
implement such a compromise since it implies equal weights in the Nash product and
hence leads to the classical Nash bargaining solution.
The situation, however, is less obvious when it comes to a committee of repre-
sentatives in which each member votes on behalf of the represented group which
typically have different sizes (as in the Council of Ministers of the EU). ‘Mass bar-
gaining’ under a symmetric decision rule would be fair, however, this is of course
very difficult to realize. The question is now how to find a voting rule for the com-
mittee of representatives such that any player would be indifferent between mass
bargaining and leaving bargaining in the hands of the representatives. This what L&V
call the ‘neutral’ rule. Assuming a strong degree of symmetry of preference profiles
within each group,26 L&V show that any voting rule is neutral which implies for each
24 As L&V point out this is equivalent to choosing one of the decisive players in the coalition at random
to be the proposer.
25 He showed the existence of weights such that the weighted utility gain (weight times the utility gain) for
each player is the same and the sum of the weighted utility gains is maximized. Furthermore, he showed
that for these weights the common solution is given by the Nash bargaining solution.
26 In particular, with the payoff of all other players outside one group fixed, the set of feasible payoffs for
the players in that group is assumed to be symmetric. Note that the latter covers a large range of possible
scenarios from unanimous preferences to zero-sum scenarios within a group.
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representative member bargaining power proportional to the size of the represented
group (their Theorem 36).
4.3 Critical appraisal of L&V’s findings on bargaining committees
In general, the binary decision rule of a dichotomous voting situation formally incor-
porates the same amount of information as a simple game in the sense of cooperative
game theory (in which coalitions either get a ‘pie’ of size zero or one to be distrib-
uted among them). This has contributed to the widespread fallacy that a priori voting
power theory is a branch of cooperative game theory only. As pointed out by Felsenthal
and Machover (2005), the spread of this mistaken view was further encouraged by a
false or at best misleading statement of Shapley and Shubik who claimed that ‘... any
scheme for imputing power among the members of a committee system either yields
the power index defined above or leads to logical inconsistency.’ (1954, p. 789). As
F&M point out, the problem with this claim is that it refers to the uniqueness proof
of the Shapley value from Shapley’s 1953 article, however, this proof is defined for
the larger class of all cooperative games. The Shapley–Shubik index is the Shapley
value on the subclass of simple games. This subclass is not closed under the alge-
braic operation of game addition—a feature entering the proof of uniqueness of the
Shapley value. ‘..but why should readers – particularly non-mathematicians – suspect
this, given the great authority of Shapley and Shubik?’ (Felsenthal and Machover
2005, p. 7).
As mentioned earlier the Shapley–Shubik index of a voter can be interpreted as
a likelihood of the voter being decisive (pivotal) in a probabilistic queue bargaining
model.27 Shapley (1953) himself never claimed that the probabilistic queue bargaining
model was convincingly realistic but mentioned it after the axiomatic work had been
done. F&M presume that his purpose to introduce this model was to provide ‘primarily
a mathematical artefact: it may not be genuinely realistic, but it is a mathematically
well-defined model that yields the Shapley value’ as well as ‘a useful visualization
and a formal aid in reasoning about the Shapley value. For example, it provides an
immediate guarantee that it behaves mathematically as expectations (in the probabi-
listic sense) of the players’ respective shares in a fixed total prize.’ (Felsenthal and
Machover 1998, p. 183). Nevertheless, the interpretation of this index as a probability
of turning the balance much like the Penrose–Banzhaf measure contributed to the
misunderstanding that both are of the same kind.
The two-ingredient model of L&V carefully distinguishes between the voting
rule and the associated simple TU game and therefore rules out any confusion. The
Shapley–Shubik index now clearly drops out as the size of pieces of ‘cake’ as a mea-
sure of voting power: it is a rational expectation in a bargaining situation with TU-like
preference profile. Furthermore, L&V’s two-ingredient setup covers all classical bar-
gaining problems and all simple TU games associated with a voting rule. Note that
this covers ‘power as a price’ following the notion of Felsenthal and Machover (1998)
27 Here, an order of the players is chosen at random. Starting with the first player, the other players join in
this order until a winning coalition is formed. The last player joining is called ‘pivotal’.
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as a special case where the vote (decision-making process) determines the winning
coalition who in turn distributes a fixed purse among them (a simple TU game).
In addition, L&V’s non-cooperative approach allows the interpretation of bargain-
ing power in a precise game-theoretic sense. Here, the source of power is the likelihood
of being the proposer given by the protocol.28
A shortcoming of L&V’s axiomatic setup is that it fails to single out one particular
bargaining agreement (bargaining power index) as a reasonable candidate. The finding
is that the Shapley–Shubik index is just one candidate fulfilling compelling require-
ments on a bargaining solution as a function of the preferences and the voting rule.
This index drops out as the unique candidate by adding Dubey (1975) transfer axiom
(L&V’s Theorem 31) defined on the voting rule. This axiom, however, has come under
critique for a lack of a compelling interpretation.29
When it comes to bargaining in a committee of representatives, L&V showed that a
fair voting rule for this committee would be one that assigns each member bargaining
power proportional to the size of the represented groups. However, due to the problem
that several indices qualify for measuring bargaining power, this result leaves open
as to which index should be applied. Here, the non-cooperative results of associating
the Nash weights with different bargaining protocols could lead to a particular choice,
say, the Shapley–Shubik index which drops out when the protocol could be interpreted
as one of the decisive players in the coalition at random to be the proposer (after the
wining coalition has been formed by adding one player at random starting from the
empty coalition).
5 Application to the EU Council of Ministers
It is a fundamental principle of the EU that all citizens should have equal rights in
whatever country they happen to live. This egalitarian idea implies that the voting
rule should be designed such that any European citizen should have equal ‘voting
power’ (equal expected utility, respectively). The heated debates on how to reform
the Treaty of Nice30 showed how the problem of arbitrariness—which power measure
to choose—can be used in a manipulative way. For example, the Penrose–Banzhaf
index (the normalized Penrose–Banzhaf measure) of a representative from Poland in
the Council of Ministers (CM) drops from 7.4192 to 5.7113% when the Treaty of Nice
28 Note that in the L&V’s general setup of a probabilistic protocol, a proposal has to be accepted by all play-
ers. The authors justify it by concern about ‘seeking consensus’ (p. 119). However, it would be interesting
to see whether or how the results change when this assumption is not made.
29 This axiom was originally formulated as ‘additivity’ in Shapley (1953) on the class of all cooperative
games. Here, leaving alone whether it is compelling, it has at least a clear meaning saying that the sum of
the values of a player in two games should be the same as his value of the sum of the games. The subclass
of simple games, however, is not closed under the algebraic operation of game addition. Therefore Dubey
(1975) modified ‘additivity’ to ‘transfer’ in order to provide a uniqueness statement for a value on the class
of simple games. Its interpretation, however, remains questionable.
30 The main critique on the Treaty of Nice was that (1) the threshold agreed on is set too high for the Council
to be an effective democratic decision-making body, (2) the decision rule (triple majority) is not transparent
and difficult to extend when more countries join, (3) the EU members are not adequately represented. For
details see Felsenthal and Machover (2001) and Leech (2002).
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is replaced by the Lisbon Treaty31 which seemed to justify the vigorous Polish pro-
test. These numbers, however, are misleading as they disregard two important issues.
(1) It is inappropriate to compare cakes of different sizes—the unnormalized Penrose–
Banzhaf measure gives a different picture. Here, by replacing the Treaty of Nice with
the Lisbon Treaty, every country wins in terms of influence. (2) The Treaty of Nice is
not a good reference point as the distribution of ‘voting power’ was skewed to begin
with. For example, the ratio between the Penrose–Banzhaf measure of a Polish citizen
and that of a German citizen was 1,4. Hence when moving towards more fairness we
cannot help the fact that overrepresented countries loose in a relative sense.
In the lively debates on the reforms on the Treaty of Nice in 2007, the Jagelionain
principle—also referred to as ‘the square root rule’—was favored by a large part of
the scientific voting society (except L&V) and vigorously supported by the Polish
president at that time, Lech Kaczynski, who had even declared his readiness to ‘die
for the square root’.32 The Jagelionain principle suggests to assign voting weights
to the representatives proportional to the square root of the population. This princi-
ple is deduced from the first and second square root rule (see Table 1), together with
the assumption the relative powers of the voters tend to approximate closely to their
respective relative weights (which is correct when Penrose’s Limit Theorem33 holds).
Next to the voting weights, a vital part of the Jagelonian compromise is the opti-
mal quota: it is the one for which the relative voting powers of the voters tend to be
most closely proportional to their respective weights. For the 27-member EU, it is
well above one half.34 A correct formulation for this quota can be found in Machover
(2007, p.4).
Chapter 5 of L&V applies the findings of Chaps. 3 and 4 to the CM of the EU. The
authors consider voting rules which were applied from 1958 to 2005 as well as the
Convention rule and the Constitution rule.35 The latter were discussed as alternatives
to the rules of the Treaty of Nice, applied in 2005 to 25 members.
The greatest number of issues in EU parlance is decided by a rule known as qual-
ified majority voting.36 From 1958 to 1995, this has been a weighted voting game
(modified with each enlargement) such that each board member is assigned a non-
negative number as weight and a proposed act is adopted if the combined weight of
those affirming it achieves a fixed quota. This changed with the Treaty of Nice 2000
whose rules were applied first for 25 members. Here, qualified majority is no longer a
single-dimensional weighted decision rule but also contains the additional requirement
31 For the data in this passage, see Aziz and Leech (forthcoming).
32 See e.g. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,489510,00.html.
33 See Sect. 3.1 of this article.
34 In the limit, when the number of members goes to infinity, this optimal quota tends to 1/2, in agreement
with the PLT (see Lindner and Machover 2004).
35 The Constitutional rule is now also known as the Lisbon rule as it was the one selected for the CM in
the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. This rule will come into force in 2014 and will be applied on more issues that
have been decided upon by unanimity so far.
36 Examples for exceptions include issues concerned with the constitution of the EU itself.
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of a winning coalition comprising the majority of members (at least 13 members).37 In
an attempt to reform the Treaty of Nice in 2001, the Convention rule for 25 members
suggests a qualified majority of the majority of the members (13 with 25 members),
representing at least 60% of the population. In the reform that finally was picked up
in the writing of the Constitutional Treaty, a winning coalition was described by a
coalition that either represented at least 65% of the population in addition to at least
55%38 of the member states or comprised 22 members. Since L&V’s analysis covers
voting scenarios only until 2005, the Jagelionain Compromise is not discussed.
In order to apply the L&V’s findings of their Chaps. 3 and 4 one has to gauge
whether the Council acts more like a tioli committee or a bargaining committee. The
former is a very special case of an environment. L&V themselves admit that it is seldom
found in real-world committees where there is usually some room for negotiations.39
Its special assumptions are certainly not matched when it comes to the two-tier EU
system. Especially at the level of the representatives, all kind of strategic behavior and
bargaining takes place. As L&V note themselves, people with experience in working
for the EU Council of Minister made it clear that bargaining was a (if not ‘the’) crucial
ingredient in the workings of the Council. This view is supported by the observation
that in EU practice a formal vote only takes place when unanimity can be expected.40
For this purpose, the proposal to be voted on is modified following the negotiations
of the CM members.
On the other hand, L&V point out that with the further enlargements of the EU,
informal bargaining might get more difficult which suggests forfeiting the concern
about general consensus. In this case, they argue, their measures developed for tioli
committees could provide an interesting assessment. In particular, they consider the
ease of passing proposals41, individual probability of success as well as their con-
ditional variants. For a normative a priori evaluation of voting rules they follow the
usual a priori model that assigns equal probability to each possible coalition, keeping
in mind, however, that implications based on this model have no predictive power.
Critical appraisal of L&V’s Chap. 5
The authors do not give theory-based advice as to what the ‘optimal’ rule would be for
the CM. None of their discussed models ‘captures the complexity of the real situation’
37 The Treaty of Nice also contained suggestions for further prospective enlargements which came into
practice in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania joined.
38 The motivation of the percentages statement was that these rules can also be applied to expansions of
the EU.
39 See L&V (2008, p. 53).
40 The fact that formal vote takes place once the Council has found a unanimous agreement would suggest
that effective voting rule is in fact unanimity. On the other hand, with each enlargement of the EU it becomes
obvious that ‘weights do matter because negotiators know that they can be outvoted’ (quote of D. Galloway,
an experienced EU practitioner, see L&V 2008, p. 163). This suggests that different (bargaining) powers
still play a role with respect to the final agreement.
41 This is defined as the ratio of all winning coalitions and all possible coalitions. This measure was
introduced by Coleman (1971) as ‘the power of a collectivity to act’.
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(p. 136). Unfortunately, this does not allow to compare their findings with the one
of traditional voting theory. On the other hand, however, it stresses the difficulty of
constructing ‘realistic’ models that cover all aspects of decision-making. Even if one
agrees on categorizing one issue to be voted on to make the committee more tioli-like
or bargaining-like there are different aspects of the procedure diluting this clear-cut
definition. For example, the CM votes on proposals submitted by the Commission
and can only modify them by common accord, i.e. unanimity. Unless this is the case
it is restricted to either accept the proposal or confirm the status quo by refusing it.
This clearly is a tioli aspect. On the other hand, unanimous agreement on an amended
version of the proposal involves bargaining. Note that this is the official version of a
CM voting procedure.
Based on insiders’ account this is how the CM actually works. The Commission
starts with an initial proposed act. It then informally and discreetly canvasses the
opinions of the members of the CM, and they also negotiate among themselves. If
it is found (unofficially) that the proposed act will not be approved by the CM, the
Commission amends the proposal and tries again. This is repeated several times. Each
such step is very much like an informal vote, in which the proposed act is rejected. In
the end, a version of the act is reached which is assured a majority in the CM. Then
a formal vote is taken and of course the act is adopted. However, this final vote is
a charade. Since a positive outcome is at this stage a foregone conclusion, members
only vote against it if they wish to make a political point—mainly in front of their
domestic public. Otherwise they vote for the act (even if initially they are not so happy
about it) or at worst abstain (which is tantamount to voting ‘no’, but is a face-saving
way of not being seen too clearly to have lost).
One could argue that what we have here is a series of informal tioli votes with
negative outcomes, followed by a theatrical official vote with positive outcome. On
the other hand, the Commission amends the proposal until a majority can be expected.
These amendments incorporate the negotiation outcomes among the CM members.
This is clearly a bargaining aspect. With successive enlargement of the EU, however,
informal bargaining becomes more and more difficult such that bargaining might
decline.
In conclusion, the official as well as the actual procedure covers tioli as well as
bargaining aspects. Hence the clear cut distinction between the two types of commit-
tees is not straightforward in the case of the CM of EU. Although the concepts are
helpful to understand impacts of the voting rules on the working of the Council, they
are not settling the issue of CM voting analysis and voting rule design. It is of course
not necessary to squeeze EU decision-making either in a tioli or a bargaining corset.
By definition, both concepts for committees are mutually exclusive, however, they
are not collectively exhaustive such that other measures especially taylored to the CM
might be more helpful. A step in this direction could be to follow L&V’s claim to
(further) specify the environment of voting into the model. Since qualified majority
voting only applies to legislation on which the European Commission or the European
Parliament also has a say, one would think of an approach which explicitly models the
Council’s interaction and negotiation with these institutions, in particular including
the latter as players. Napel and Widgren (2009) consider such an explicit model of the
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EU decision-making process (carrying out strategic equilibrium analysis of the EU’s
consultation procedure in a spatial model).
As an alternative to the model of Napel and Widgren, one could specify L&V’s non-
cooperative approach of a bargaining committee for EU decision-making.42 Recall
that their approach considers protocols setting up rules according to which negotia-
tions proceed in the committee. Here, the motivation was to single out one particular
candidate of the set of rational bargaining agreements (characterized by L&V’s The-
orem 29). A protocol tailored to EU proceedings could perform the task to choose the
appropriate bargaining power measure for EU applications.
Based on L&V’s results on tioli and bargaining committees, one could still make
the careful attempt to deduce an ‘optimal’ voting rule for two-tier voting systems
like the CM. Since the authors claim that from an egalitarian point of view the rule
does not matter anyway in two-tier tioli committees, the collective decision could
be governed entirely from an egalitarian point of view of a bargaining model. Here,
with respect to the represented EU citizens, the rule should be a weighted rule that
assigns any representative bargaining power proportional to the size of the country
represented (L&V’s Theorem 36).43 Recall that in bargaining committees this find-
ing was considered to be a compromise between utilitarian and egalitarian aspects in
two-stage games. Finally, the remaining degrees of freedom—e.g. if several voting
rules or different quota qualify—could be used following utilitarian criteria for tioli
committees.
Appendix
Arbitrariness is not the only reason why the acceptance of the theory and measurement
of voting and voting power is still modest. Further—probably minor reasons next to
ambiguity—are (1) the critique that a priori voting power is said to misrepresent actual
voting power as well as (2) computational problems.
(1) A priori voting power abstracts away from voters’ preferences, the degree of
affinity between the voters and coalition formation as well as the prior bias with
respect to the issue to be voted upon. The point is to provide insight into the
power implications of the decision rule itself rather than on other aspects of the
political environment. Roth (1988, p.9) puts it this way. ‘This kind of analysis
seems to be just what is needed to analyze the voting rules in a new constitution,
for example, long before the specific issues to be voted on arise or the specific
factions and personalitites that will be involved can be indentified.’ Nevertheless,
a priori voting power is often said to misrepresent actual voting power, a criti-
cism to which I would like to retort as follows. (i) Any discussion on a posteriori
or actual voting power (as opposed to a priori) cannot go without understanding
the power equipment due to the voting rule itself, i.e. a priori voting power. (ii)
Measures of actual voting power are typically based on real-world frequencies
of observed voting patterns over a suitable period of time. These frequencies
42 See L&V 2008, Subsect. 4.4.
43 In order to achieve that, the European commission could be made redundant as an agenda setter.
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are then taken to estimate the probability of occurrence of every possible voting
configuration. Leaving aside the thorny question of how to obtain sufficiently
reliable information of such kind44 this approach is not without problems. As
an example take the problem of strategic voting when voter’s misreport their
true preferences in order to manipulate the voting outcome to their favor.45
Dichotomous monotonic voting rules, however, preclude the problem of strate-
gic voting.
(2) When it comes to actually compute the value of a (power) measure for a given
decision-making body, two difficulties are typical, getting worse with increasing
number of voters: running time and memory requirements. This stems from the
fact that the voters face the binary decision to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’, which implies
that the total number of possible outcomes rises exponentially with increas-
ing assembly size. Already with a modest number of voters, say 27 as is the
case in the EU, the problem might be beyond any disposable computational
capacity (see Leech 2003 and Lindner 2004). For weighted voting games, the
computational effort can be reduced in order to increase polynomially using the
method of generating functions combined with storing methods for sparse matri-
ces (Lindner 2004). Unfortunately, this method is not without limitation due to
another algorithmic complexity which is memory requirement (space complex-
ity). This problem can be substantial, both in terms of integer size and array
dimension which asks for approximation methods (see Leech 2003; Lindner
2004).
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